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IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1953
CHACO NATION OF THE CHACO INDIAN RESERVATION,
DEPAULIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
EDWARD WILLIAMSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of DePaulia.
No. 12 X 123 - Patricia A. Jehle, Judge.
ARGUED August 11, 2012 -DECIDED November 14, 2012
Before CLARK, SIMON, and LEMONCELLI, Circuit Judges.
CLARK, Circuit Judge.
The Chaco Nation of the Chaco Indian Reservation (Chaco
Nation), located in DePaulia, appeals the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of DePaulia. The
district court held, first, that the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et
seq., does not vest in the Chaco Nation control of the disposition
of the approximately 14,000-year-old human remains of a
deceased individual. Second, the district court held that the
vesting of the approximately 500- to 700-year-old funerary objects
associated with the human remains of a Native American
individual, which were removed from land owned in fee simple by
Dr. Edward "Ed" Williamson (Williamson) and situated within the
exterior boundaries of the Chaco Indian Reservation, would
constitute a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. For
the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the District
Court and remand for findings consistent with this holding.
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I.
The facts in this case are not in dispute.' The Chaco Nation is
an Indian entity recognized and eligible to receive services from
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. As such, the Chaco
Nation is acknowledged to have the immunities and privileges
available to other federally recognized Indian tribes by virtue of
their government-to-government relationship with the United
States, as well as the responsibilities, powers, limitations, and
obligations of such tribes. The Chaco Nation is an "Indian tribe"
for the purposes of NAGPRA. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(7).
Historically, the people of the Chaco Nation lived more than
1,100 miles from the present-day Chaco Indian Reservation. By
1854, the Chaco Nation had entered into a number of treaties with
the United States, through which they ceded millions of acres of
land to the Federal government. Under the Treaty of 1854, all
members of the Chaco Nation were required to remove to a
reservation in DePaulia Territory.
Following the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the
Dawes Act, Congress systematically allotted lands on most Indian
reservations, and the Chaco Indian Reservation was no exception.
In addition to diminishing the tribal land estate, the reservation
was opened to settlement by non-Indians. As a result, today the
land within the exterior boundaries of the Chaco Indian
Reservation is a "checkerboard" pattern comprised of individual
Indian allotments held in trust by the United States; the DePaulia
National Forest, owned and administered by the United States as
part of the National Forest System; fee land owned by non-Indians,
and the communal lands of the Chaco Nation held in trust by the
United States. Under NAGPRA, all these lands within the exterior
boundaries of the Chaco Indian Reservation are deemed to be
"tribal land." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15)(A).
Appellee Williamson is a retired professor of ethnobiology at
DePaulia University and a member of the National Academy of
1. Our rendition of the facts is adapted from the district court's published
opinion in this case. See Chaco Nation v. Williamson, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1983
(N.D. Dep. 2011). No party on appeal disputes the district court's findings of
fact, which are supported by the administrative record.
526
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/10
2013 MOOT COURT PROBLEM
Sciences. He is also the non-Indian owner of land in fee simple
within the exterior boundaries of the Chaco Indian Reservation.
The land in question is Harper Springs Ranch, 80 acres of prime
grazing land that have been in the Williamson family since 1900.
Harper Springs Ranch is bounded on the east by the Abiquiu
River, which is fed by the Abiquiu Reservoir to the north.
In August 2008, severe rains caused the Abiquiu River to slip its
banks and erode an area that included Williamson's land. During
a lull in the rain, Williamson went outside to survey the damage
caused by the flooding and found that, at two sites on opposite
sides of his eastern property line (Site I and Site II), the flooding
had created 20-foot vertical escarpments. At Site I, Williamson
discovered what he believed to be a human skull in eroded
sediment, as well as additional bones nearby that appeared to
belong to the skeleton. The skeleton was later determined to be
95% complete. At Site II, Williamson discovered another
complete set of human remains by a bank of sediment that had
washed down in the flood. Associated with the human remains at
Site II were two fully intact vessels painted both inside and out.
As the threat of heavy rain and attendant flooding was imminent,
Williamson removed the ex-situ human remains and objects and
transported them to his house in order to protect them.
After the rains abated, Williamson notified the President of the
Chaco Nation about the human remains and objects that he had
discovered at Sites I and II and the action he had taken to protect
them. He also notified the local police, who transferred the
remains to the district medical examiner for analysis.2  The
medical examiner performed an autopsy and determined that
neither skeleton was of recent origin. Unable to come to a definite
conclusion as to the skeletons' ages, and believing Williamson to
have discovered two separate unmarked burials,' the medical
2. Under the DePaulia Code, "[w]hen an unmarked burial is discovered
other than during an archaeological excavation authorized by the State or an
educational institution . . . the district medical examiner shall be notified."
DEPAULIA STAT. § 872.05 (4)).
3. Based on an examination of the remains and objects and Sites I and II,
the examining anthropologist concluded, and Williamson concedes, that the
human remains and objects derive from two different burials, and that the burial
in Site 11 is that of an American Indian.
2013] 527
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examiner called upon the expertise of Dr. Christie Toth, an
anthropologist attached to the local university. Dr. Toth concluded
from the physical characteristics that the remains from Site II were
American Indian and identified the associated jars as Fancy Type
IIIclb Ware belonging to the Early Riverine Horizon of the Late
DePaulian Culture (A.D. 1300-1500).4
Dr. Toth's initial examination of the remains from Site I, which
she determined to have been an adult male aged 40-50 years,
suggested that the remains were those of a European settler.
However, subsequent radiocarbon dating tests performed by Dr.
Toth's laboratory in September 2008 revealed that the skeleton
was approximately 14,000 years old. In addition, x-rays and CT
scans showed a stone projectile resembling a "long-stemmed
point" lodged in the skeleton's upper hip bone. Such stone points
predate the arrival of Europeans in the region by thousands of
years. The skeleton from Site I, which has become known
colloquially by some as "Harper Man" and by others as "The
Elder,"' attracted attention because some of its physical features-
such as the shape of the face and skull-differed from those of
modem American Indians, and because it is the oldest human
skeleton and the best preserved skeleton older than 8,000 years
discovered to date in the Americas.'
In January 2009, the Chaco Nation contacted Williamson in
order to arrange for transfer of the human remains and associated
funerary objects to the tribe under NAGPRA. Williamson agreed
to transfer the Native American human remains from the burial in
Site II to the Chaco Nation, but refused to transfer the remains of
Harper Man and the associated funerary objects from the burial at
Site II to the tribe. In a letter to the President of the Chaco Nation,
Williamson voiced his concern that he believed the expressed
4. This type of pottery is very rare and features "kill holes," which indicate
that the vessels were made specifically for use during burial feasts and thereafter
buried with the individuals. During recent auctions, such pieces have sold for
upwards of $8,000 each. Williamson concedes that the pots are funerary objects
and are "cultural items" under NAGPRA.
5. Because the District Court in the proceeding below referred to the
remains as "Harper Man," we follow the same convention.
6. Except for the bone sent for radiocarbon dating, the human remains and
objects were returned to Williamson, together with the anthropologist's report.
528
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intent of the tribe to immediately re-bury the remains in a secret
location on tribal lands would forever deprive researchers of
access to a unique, possibly irreplaceable specimen of human
history. Williamson also indicated that, because of the
significance of the skeleton to the migration patterns of the earliest
Americans and his fear that Harper Man would be reburied and not
accessible for study, he wished to ensure access to the remains by
the American School of Research on the First Inhabitants of the
Americas, a non-profit educational institution, for further research
and study. He also stated that he intended to make a long-term
loan of the two ceramic jars to his alma mater, the University of
DePaulia.
In response, the Chaco Nation brought an action in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of DePaulia under section
15 of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3013, alleging that Williamson had
violated section 3 of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002, by retaining the
human remains and associated funerary objects in question. The
Chaco Nation asked the district court to issue an order to enforce
the ownership or control provisions of section 3(a)(2)(a) of
NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (a)(2)(A), and compel Williamson to
transfer the remains of Harper Man and the associated funerary
objects from the Site II burial to the tribe.' There being no issue of
material fact, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court denied the Chaco Nation's request on both counts, and the
tribe brings the instant appeal.
First, the tribe argues that the district court erroneously
concluded that human remains must bear some relationship to a
presently existing tribe, people, or culture in holding that the
14,000-year-old human remains are not "Native American" as
defined in NAGPRA and therefore are not subject to the
ownership provisions of NAGPRA. Second, the tribe challenges
the district court's conclusion that vesting in the Chaco Nation
control of the associated funerary objects removed from Site II on
7. The Chaco Nation concedes that the tribe is not culturally affiliated with
either the human remains or the associated funerary objects in question, and
Williamson concedes that he is not related to the individual in the Site II burial.
In addition, the State of DePaulia has not asserted any jurisdictional authority
over these remains or objects.
2013] 529
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Williamson's land would result in a taking of property without
compensation within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and that, as a consequence, the
requirements of section 3 of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002, and its
implementing regulations do not apply to Williamson's land with
respect to the associated funerary objects. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the judgment of the district
court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
our opinion.
II.
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) was enacted "to provide for the protection of Native
American graves, and for other purposes." See Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3001 et
seq.) In providing that protection, the federal government acted in
an area of law where, until the 20th century, only the states had
affirmatively exercised authority.
The states have general powers to enact statutes for the health,
safety, and general welfare of their citizens, including statutes
governing human burials. The federal government has the power
to enact statutes governing human burials located on lands of the
United States and lands of Indian tribes or individuals which are
either held in trust by the United States or are subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States. In
addition, it is settled law that, as derived from the Indian
Commerce Clause, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3, the Constitution expressly
grants to the federal government exclusive (or "plenary") authority
over Indian affairs, including the authority to enact statutes for the
benefit of Indians, such as those protecting Native American
graves. However, Congress cannot exercise one of its powers in
such a way as to effect an uncompensated taking of private
property, as such an action would contravene the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.' Consequently,
"[a]ctions authorized or required under. .. [the NAGPRA]
8. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
530
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regulations will not apply to tribal lands to the extent that any
action would result in a taking of property without compensation
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(2)(iv) (2011). With these
considerations in mind, we turn to the two issues before us-(1)
the meaning of the term "Native American" as defined under
NAGPRA, and (2) whether NAGPRA's vesting control in the
"tribal land" tribe of "associated funerary objects" removed from
fee simple land situated within the exterior boundaries of an Indian
reservation would result in a taking of property without
compensation within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
A. The Meaning of the Term "Native American" under NAGPRA
NAGPRA establishes rights of ownership or control in Native
American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and
objects of cultural patrimony that are discovered or excavated on
Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990. 25 U.S.C. §
3001(a). Before any inquiry as to the priority of right of ownership
or control of human remains is reached, we must determine
whether the human remains are Native American within the
meaning of NAGPRA. If they are not, then they fall outside the
scope of NAGPRA. If they are, then the requirements of
NAGPRA attach, and an inquiry into the allocation of ownership
or control is conducted. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d
864, 875 (9th Cir. 2004).' NAGPRA defines "Native American"
as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to
the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). The phrase "is
indigenous" is not defined in NAGPRA or its implementing
regulations.
9. Under section 3 of NAGPRA, priority of control of the disposition of
Native American human remains and associated funerary objects discovered on
Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990, vests in the lineal descendants
of the deceased Native American. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1). When no lineal
descendant can be ascertained, priority of control vests in the Indian tribe on
whose tribal land the human remains and funerary objects were discovered. 25
U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A).
2013] 531
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The district court, following the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bonnichsen, agreed with
Williamson that the remains of Harper Man must relate to a
presently existing tribe to fall within the scope of NAGPRA. In
Bonnichsen, the Ninth Circuit confronted the same definitional
issue. There, anthropologist plaintiffs sought to prevent the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers from transferring 9,000-year-old human
remains removed from Corps land to Indian tribes. Bonnichsen,
367 F.3d at 868-69. The Bonnichsen court presumed that the use
of the present tense in the phrase "is indigenous" would ordinarily
and naturally refer to "the present time." Therefore, the court
concluded that Congress's use of the present tense in its definition
of "Native American" signified its intent to require a relationship
to a presently existing Indian tribe and found that the evidence did
not show such a relationship. Id. at 875, 877-78.
We review de novo the district court's interpretation of
NAGPRA's definition of "Native American." See, e.g., United
States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Statutory
interpretation is something a district court undertakes as a matter
of law . . .. We review legal determinations made by a district
court de novo"). In the absence of statutory or regulatory guidance
as to the meaning of the phrase "is indigenous" in the definition of
Native American," we look to the principles of statutory
construction to inform our interpretation of this phrase.
Congress's use of the present tense is a significant indication of
congressional intent with respect to the interpretation of statutory
provisions. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 875 n.15; see also Carr v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010) ("Consistent with
normal usage, we have frequently looked to Congress' choice of
verb tense to ascertain a statute's temporal reach"). Nevertheless,
"the definition of words in isolation is not necessarily controlling
in statutory construction." Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S.
481, 486 (2006). Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon
reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and
context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities
that inform the analysis. Importantly, verb tense, too, must be
considered within the context of the statute. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at
2237. As "[t]he present tense is commonly used to refer to past,
present, and future all at the same time," Coalition for Clean Air v.
532
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Southern Cal. Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219, 225 (9th Cir. 1992), the
use of the present tense in the definition of "Native American," in
and of itself, does not necessarily foreclose the meaning of that
term as propounded by the Chaco Nation.
In interpreting statutes, absurd results are to be avoided.
McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (2011) (quoting
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992)). According to
the district court's interpretation, Native American-ness becomes
mutable-one day you're in, and the next day you're out. Thus,
the human remains of an individual who dies today, if they bear
some relationship to an indigenous tribe, people, or culture
existing today, are "Native American." However, 14,000 years
from today, when the human remains of that same individual are
discovered, unless they bear some relationship to an indigenous
tribe, people, or culture existing 14,000 years from today, they will
not be "Native American." We consider that result to be absurd.
Once the human remains of an individual are "Native American,"
they stay "Native American." The passage of time does not
transform them from Native American to non-Native American.
Consequently, the human remains of an individual who, at the time
of death 14,000 years ago, bore some relationship to a tribe,
people, or culture indigenous to the preset-day geographical area
of the United States are "Native American" when they are
discovered in 2008. In order to avoid interpreting "Native
American" in an absurd manner, we find that Congress did not
intend the meaning of "is indigenous" given that phrase by the
district court in this case and by the Ninth Circuit in Bonnichsen.
Further, statutes must be construed so that no word or clause is
rendered surplusage or null. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,
249 (1998). If the words "is indigenous" are interpreted to refer
only to a relationship to a presently-existing Indian tribe, then
other parts of NAGPRA would be rendered meaningless.
Specifically, the term "culturally unidentifiable human remains,"
25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(5), would be rendered a nullity because if
only remains with a relationship to a presently-existing tribe would
qualify as "Native American," there would be no such thing as
"culturally unidentifiable human remains." As we must give
meaning to all words of the statute, we find that Congress did not
intend to limit the meaning of "is indigenous."
2013]1 533
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The context and design of NAGPRA convince this Court to
construe the use of the present tense as referring to the present and
the past. Consequently, we hold that the human remains of an
individual who, at the time of death, is related to a tribe, people, or
culture that is indigenous to the present-day geographical area of
the United States are "Native American" under NAGPRA, no
matter whether the human remains bear a relationship to a present-
day Indian tribe or are culturally unidentifiable.
We are further prompted to this conclusion by the Indian canon
of construction which directs that, where a statute is passed for the
benefit of Indian tribes, the statute is "to be liberally construed,
[with] doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the
Indians." Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976)
(citation omitted). NAGPRA is a statute that was passed for the
benefit of Indians. To interpret NAGPRA as requiring that human
remains bear a relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or
culture in order to be considered "Native American" would not
favor the right of Indian tribes to control the disposition of an
individual who, at the time of death, is related to a tribe, people, or
culture that is indigenous to the geographical area of the United
States, but who is not related to a present-day Indian tribe. For all
the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court
with respect to the meaning of "Native American" and remand for
further proceedings consistent with our holding.
B. Whether NAGPRA's Vesting of Right of Control of "Associated
Funerary Objects" Removed from Fee Simple Land within the
Exterior Boundaries of an Indian Reservation Would Result in a
Taking of Property without Compensation within the Meaning
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Under section 3 of NAGPRA, priority of control of Native
American human remains and associated funerary objects
discovered on Federal or tribal lands' after November 16, 1990,
vests in the lineal descendants of the deceased Native American.
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(1). When no lineal descendant can be
10. "Tribal land" is defined to include all lands within the exterior
boundaries of any Indian reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15)(A).
534
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ascertained, priority of control vests in the Indian tribe on whose
tribal land the human remains and funerary objects were
discovered. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A). As Williamson's land lies
within the exterior boundaries of the Chaco Reservation, under the
statute, ownership or control of the two ceramic jars associated
with the Native American human remains removed from Site II
would vest in the Chaco Nation. However, the district court held
that vesting in the Chaco Nation ownership or control of the two
ceramic jars would result in a taking of property without
compensation and, thus, the actions required under NAGPRA and
its implementing regulations do not apply to the associated
funerary objects."
In deciding this issue, we note that it is a matter of first
impression not only for the Twelfth Circuit, but for any United
States court. We have already stated that the land in which the
Site II Native American skeleton and pottery vessels were interred
belongs in fee simple to Mr. Williamson, and that Williamson
stipulates that he is not related to the Native American individual
in the Site II burial. Although Williamson makes no claims as to
control of the disposition of the human remains in the Site II
burial, we nonetheless will address the matter of the human
remains as part of our analysis regarding the two pottery vessels
associated with those remains.
According to the Supreme Court, property interests are not
created by the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972). "Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits." Id. Whether a substantive interest created by the
state rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property
11. Under the regulations interpreting NAGPRA, actions that are authorized
or required by NAGPRA do not apply to tribal lands if the action would
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(2)(iv)
(2011). While the issue here could be phrased as whether the vesting of control
of the vessels in the Chaco Nation is authorized by NAGPRA, we focus instead
on the underlying question of whether such vesting constitutes a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.
5352013]
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interest, however, is a question of federal constitutional law.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)
(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 602 (1972)). This determination does not rest on the label
attached to a right, but rather on the substance of the right. See
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Under the common law, if no true owner can be identified, an
object discovered embedded in the soil is generally recognized as
belonging to the owner of the land in which the object is
embedded based on the landowner's constructive possession of the
object. Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bishop v.
Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Allred v. Biegel,
219 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1949); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 39
S.E.2d 308 (Va. 1946); Schley v. Couch, 284 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
1955)). Human remains that are discovered embedded in the soil,
however, are not considered to constitute property (that is,
something that may be subject to ownership).
Protection of the sanctity of human remains being of paramount
importance, under the common law, no general property interest
exists in human remains. Instead, the next-of-kin of a deceased
individual are recognized as having a "quasi-property right" to
control the burial or other lawful disposition of the decedent's
remains. See, e.g., Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc.,
174 W.Va. 458, 460-61 (W. Va. App. 1985); Long v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. RY Co., 15 Okla. 512 (1905); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S.
471 (1896); Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237 (Tenn. 2010).
Federal courts have protected this right under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against actions by state
governments.12 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th
Cir. 2002); Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir.
1995); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). The
right to control the disposition of human remains also has been
12. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from "depri[ving] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. This same prohibition applies to the Federal government
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V.
536
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extended to Indian tribes that are culturally affiliated with the
human remains of the deceased individual. See Charrier v. Bell,
496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986). However, courts have found
that, with regard to the body or body parts of a decedent, no one,
not even the next-of-kin, may maintain an action for conversion,
i.e., an action for the wrongful taking of property. See Shults v.
United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1998); Bauer v. N.
Fulton Med Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. App. Ct. 1999); Bourgoin
v. Stanley Med Research Inst., No. CV-05-34, 2005 WL 3882080
at *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2005); Boorman v. Nev. Mem.
Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4 (Nev. 2010); see also Colavito
v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y.
2006).
When the existing rules or understandings that stem from
independent, state law sources are applied to the facts of the matter
before this court, Williamson clearly does not have any protected
right or interest in the Native American human remains of the
individual in the burial at Site II. But does he have a property
interest in the two vessels that is protected under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
Are rights or interests in human remains in a burial severable from
rights or interests in the funerary objects associated with the
human remains in that burial? No, because the rights or interests
in both are identical in scope. Just as the "quasi-property right" or
"property interest" to control the burial or other lawful disposition
of a decedent are only in the next-of-kin, the right to control what
goes into the burial along with the decedent's body, as well as
what comes out of that burial, is in those same parties. Thus,
whenever funerary objects are removed from a grave, they belong
to the person who furnished the grave or to the decedent's known
descendants or next-of-kin. See, e.g., Charrier, 496 So. 2d at 601;
State ex. Rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001).
The placement of objects in a grave or burial is not an act of
abandonment, which might make the object subject to a property
interest in the finder. As the court in Charrier observed, under the
common law, "[t]he relinquishment of possession [of grave goods
in a burial] normally serves some spiritual, moral, or religious
purpose of the descendant/owner, but is not intended as a means of
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relinquishing ownership to a stranger." Charrier, 496 So. 2d at
605. To apply the principles of abandonment to objects associated
in a burial with human remains "would render a grave subject to
despoliation either immediately after interment or definitely after
removal of the descendants of the deceased from the neighborhood
of the cemetery." Id.
In addition, some state statutes governing the disposition of
Native American human remains expressly treat funerary objects
associated with a burial in the same manner as they do the human
remains themselves. For example, Tennessee law provides that
"[a]ny Native American human remains or any Native American
burial objects discovered in the course of an excavation,
exhumation or accidentally ... shall be properly reburied
following scientific analysis . . . in accordance with procedures
formulated by the advisory council which are appropriate to Native
American traditions." Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-6-119 (2012)
(emphasis added). Furthermore, we can find no existing rules or
understandings that stem from state law sources to show that a
right or interest in the finder to the funerary objects interred with a
decedent is a constitutionally protected "property interest" under
the Takings Clause, and we decline to create such an interest
today.
Finding that the scope of the right or interest in controlling the
disposition of human remains in a burial and the scope of the right
or interest in controlling the disposition of objects placed in that
burial to be identical, we conclude that a burial or grave is a
unified res." Some support for our finding can be found in a
13. We note that such a consideration is not unprecedented. For example,
an analogy can be found in maritime/admiralty law, wherein shipwrecks as a
whole-often consisting of both property and human remains-are generally
treated as a legally unified res, which has the effect of preventing the severing
of part of that property from the remainder. California v. Deep Sea Research,
Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1998). This principle is applied even in situations
in which parts of the res can be legally distinguished from other parts, as when a
portion of a shipwreck consists of insured property and a portion consists of
property that is uninsured. See id.; see also Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v.
Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) (treating all
property found on a sunken vessel belonging to a foreign sovereign as sovereign
property).
538
14
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/10
2013 MOOT COURT PROBLEM
federal statute. In the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
("ARPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1), Congress stated that a grave
which is at least 100 years old shall be considered an
archaeological resource. Under ARPA, a grave means any portion
or a piece of a grave. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1). Therefore, a grave
that contains both human remains and funerary objects is an
archaeological resource and not several disaggregated
archaeological resources.
As Williamson clearly does not have any protected right or
interest in the Native American human remains of the individual in
the burial at Site II, he likewise does not have any constitutionally
protected right or interest in the funerary objects associated with
the burial, i.e., the two pottery vessels. Consequently, we hold that
NAGPRA's vesting of right of control of the associated funerary
objects removed from Williamson's land in the Chaco Nation
would not result in a taking of property without compensation
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with our
holding.
LEMONCELLI, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I dissent. I believe that the district court applied the proper
standard in determining that Harper Man is not Native American,
as that phrase is defined in section 2(9) of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA"), 25 U.S.C §
3001(9). I also would find that the two vessels discovered by
Williamson at Site II are private property belonging to
Williamson; that vesting ownership or control of the vessels in the
Chaco Nation would result in a taking of property without just
compensation within the meaning of the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and that such an action falls outside the jurisdiction
of NAGPRA. Thus, I would affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
2013] 539
15
DePaul College of Law: 2013 Cultural Heritage Moot Court Competition Problem
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:525
A. The Remains of Harper Man Are "Native American" Only If
They Bear Some Relationship to a Presently Existing,
Indigenous Tribe, People, or Culture
The district court found that, based on a lack of evidence in the
record to show that Harper Man bears some relationship to a
presently existing, indigenous tribe, people, or culture, the remains
of Harper Man are not Native American within the meaning of
NAGPRA and NAGPRA does not apply to them. The majority
now reverses that determination. I cannot agree.
In interpreting a statute, we start with the plain language of the
provisions to be interpreted. Alston v. Country Wide Financial
Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 759 (3d Cir. 2009). Where no ambiguity in
the language exists, it is not necessary to go further. Toibb v.
Radloff 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991). It is axiomatic that, in
construing a statute, courts generally give words not defined in the
statute their ordinary and natural meaning. United States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994).
While NAGPRA defines the term "Native American," 25 U.S.C.
§ 3001(9), it does not define the phrase "that is indigenous" within
that term. However, the text of the relevant statutory clause is
written in the present ("of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture
that is indigenous"). Congress's use of the present tense is
significant when interpreting Congress's intentions. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
59 (1987). In the context of NAGPRA, I presume that Congress
gave the phrase "is indigenous" its ordinary or natural meaning
and that, by using the present tense, Congress referred to presently
existing indigenous tribes, people, or cultures. Consequently, I
would agree with the district court in this case and the Ninth
Circuit in Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 878 (9th Cir.
2004), that human remains must bear some relationship to a
presently existing indigenous tribe, people, or culture in order to be
"Native American" under NAGPRA, that this requirement is
unambiguous, and that, consequently, it is not necessary to go
further in interpreting the plain language of the statute.
The majority finds that the interpretation of "Native American"
propounded by the district court would produce an absurd result
because the mere passage of time can transform Native American
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human remains into non-Native American human remains. I
disagree. The exact issue before this Court is not whether the
human remains of Harper Man are Native American. Rather, at
issue is the standard for determining whether human remains are
Native American for purposes ofNAGPRA.
Distinguishing between those human remains that bear some
relationship to a presently existing indigenous tribe, people, or
culture and those that do not doesn't produce an absurd result
because such a distinction accords with NAGPRA's purposes.
"As regards newly discovered human remains, NAGPRA was
enacted with two main goals: to respect the burial traditions of
modem-day American Indians and to protect the human dignity of
the body after death." Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876. Congress's
purposes would not be served by requiring the transfer to modem
American Indians of human remains that bear no relationship to
them. Id. Moreover, the exhumation and study of ancient human
remains that are unrelated to modem American Indians was not a
target of Congress's aim, nor was it precluded by NAGPRA. Id.
The majority also finds that the district court's interpretation of
"Native American" renders the term "culturally unidentifiable
human remains," 25 U.S.C.
§ 3006(c)(5), a nullity because only remains with a relationship
to a presently existing indigenous tribe would qualify as "Native
American," so there could be no such thing as "culturally
unidentifiable human remains." Again, I disagree.
Asking whether human remains are Native American requires
only a general finding that remains have a "relationship to a
presently existing indigenous 'tribe, people, or culture,' a
relationship that goes beyond features common to all humanity."
Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 877. As the magistrate judge in
Bonnichsen stated, "It is clear from the full text of NAGPRA that
the cultural relationship required to meet the definition of 'Native
American' is less than that required to meet the definition of
'cultural affiliation."' Bonnichsen v. U. S. Dep't of the Army, 217
F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1138 (D. Or. 2002). This is because the
requirements for establishing "Native American" status under
NAGPRA
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may be satisfied not only by showing a relationship to
existing tribes or people, but also by showing a
relationship to a present-day 'culture' that is indigenous
to the United States. The culture that is indigenous to
the 48 contiguous states is the American Indian culture,
which was here long before the arrival of modem
Europeans and continues today. Id. (emphasis added).
Asking which Indian tribe bears the closest relationship to
Native American human remains, on the other hand, requires a
more specific finding that the remains are most closely affiliated to
specific lineal descendants or to a specific Indian tribe.
Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 877. The district court's interpretation of
"Native American" preserves these two distinct inquiries and, thus,
does not render the term "culturally unidentifiable human remains"
a nullity.
The majority invokes the Indian canon of construction to
support their interpretation of "Native American." I believe they
misapply the canon in the instant case. Case law demonstrates that
the Indian canon of construction is only applied where there is an
ambiguity in the statute. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S.
759, 766 (1985). The Indian canon of construction cannot be used
to contradict an unambiguous statute. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v.
United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 467, 478 (Fed. Cl. 2006). Moreover, the
canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in
favor of Indians does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do
not exist. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498,
506 (1986). As the majority has not found the term "Native
American" to be ambiguous, it cannot rely on the Indian canon of
construction to support its interpretation of that term.
Although I recognize that the interpretation of "Native
American" propounded by the district court in this case and by the
Ninth Circuit in Bonnichsen might be potentially painful to some,
the court is not free to rewrite the statute that Congress enacted.
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005). "When a
statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to
enforce it according to its terms." Id. (quoting Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
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(2000)). As the disposition required by the text here is not absurd,
it is for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it believes
the term "Native American" to be unduly restrictive. See Dodd,
545 U.S. at 359-60.
B. Vesting Ownership or Control in the Chaco Nation of the
Associated Funerary Objects Would Result in a Taking of
Private Property without Compensation
Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Williamson, the majority holds that Williamson has no protected
property right or interest in the two vessels found at Site II, and
that physically taking the funerary objects from Williamson and
transferring them to the Chaco Nation would not result in a taking
of private property without compensation within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. I disagree. I believe that, with respect to
the associated funerary objects in question, the actions required
under Section 3 of NAGPRA and the regulations promulgated
thereto do not apply to the land Williamson owns in fee simple.
I agree with the majority that, in exercising exclusive (or
"plenary") authority to enact statutes for the benefit of Indians,
such as NAGPRA, Congress cannot exercise that power in such a
way as to effect an uncompensated taking of private property. The
legislative history of NAGPRA, though, does not explicitly
indicate whether Congress believed that the vesting of the right of
control of associated funerary objects removed from fee simple
land within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation would
result in a taking of property without compensation within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.14 I am
14. Interestingly, at least two courts have found that private land entirely
falls outside the scope of section 3 of NAGPRA. See Kawaiisu Tribe of Tejon
v. Salazar, No. 1:09-cv-01977, 2011 WL 489561 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7,
2011); Van Zandt v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 524 F. Supp. 2d 239, 247, n.7
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) ("NAGPRA only protects Indian artifacts found on Federal or
Indian tribal grounds not private property."). The issue of whether fee simple
lands within the exterior boundaries of a reservation are "tribal land" is not
before this Court. Rather, our review is limited to the application of Section 3
of NAGPRA and its implementing regulations to Williamson's fee-owned land
with respect to the associated funerary objects in question.
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convinced, though, that the Secretary of the Interior, who is
responsible for promulgating regulations to carry out NAGPRA,
25 U.S.C. § 3011, has interpreted the law as not applying to fee
simple land located within the exterior boundaries of a reservation
with respect to associated funerary objects that, as is the case here,
are not culturally affiliated with the "tribal land" tribe.
In 2010, the Secretary promulgated a final rule, codified at 43
C.F.R. § 10.11, concerning the disposition of culturally
unidentifiable Native American human remains in holdings or
collections of museums or Federal agencies. 75 Fed. Reg. 12,378
(Mar. 15, 2010). Under that rule, the disposition of Native
American human remains determined to be "culturally
unidentifiable" is to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations based on their past geographical affiliation to the
remains, i.e., the remains were removed either from land that, at
the time of removal, was the tribal land of an Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization, or from land that was aboriginally
occupied by an Indian tribe or tribes. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.11(c).
Regarding the funerary objects associated with such human
remains, the Secretary provided that "mandatory disposition for
this category of items raises right of possession and takings issues
that are not clearly resolved in the statute or the legislative history,
[and] the common law regarding associated funerary objects that
are not culturally identifiable is not well established." Id. at
12,398 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Secretary did not consider
it appropriate to make the provision to transfer such associated
funerary objects mandatory. In essence, the Secretary believed
first, that, at minimum, certain associated funerary objects are
property for which a taking challenge may be maintained and,
second, that vesting ownership in a non-culturally affiliated Indian
tribe of associated funerary objects which are in the possession of
another party, based solely on the tribe's past geographical
affiliation to the land from which the associated funerary objects
were removed, would raise takings issues.
I agree with the Secretary's interpretation of the law and would
hold that, likewise, vesting ownership of the two associated
funerary objects in the non-culturally affiliated Chaco Nation,
based solely on the Chaco Nation's past geographical affiliation to
the land from which the associated funerary objects were removed,
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would result in a taking of property and, thus, that under the terms
of the regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, 43
C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(2)(iv), the actions authorized or required under
section 3 of NAGPRA and its implementing regulations do not
apply to Williamson's land with respect to the two pottery vessels.
The majority's reliance on a unified res theory to avoid a taking
of property without compensation is faulty. The rights or interests
in the human remains and in the funerary objects in a burial are not
identical in scope. Our common law tradition in the United States
derives from the English common law. Under English common
law, "a person who removed the corpse from the grave was guilty
of a larceny of the things buried with the corpse but not [the
corpse]." Hugh Y. Bernard, The Law ofDeath and Disposal of the
Dead 16 (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, at common law, objects
buried in a grave have been considered to be property. While
states and even the federal government may enact laws requiring
that a dead body and the objects placed with that body in a grave
be considered a unified res, in the absence of such a law, we need
look to the common law for guidance on determining the
ownership of the associated funerary objects removed from
Williamson's land. 5
Under our common law tradition, as derived from the English
common law, absent a true owner, property embedded in the soil,
which (based on the analysis above) includes objects buried in a
grave, belongs to the owner of the locus in quo. In re Search and
Seizure of Shivers, 890 F. Supp. 613, 615 (E.D. Tex. 1995);
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged from the Nashville,
15. The majority's use of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
("ARPA") to support a unified res theory would appear to me to be self-
defeating. A grave that contains both human remains and funerary objects
might be an archaeological resource under ARPA (16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l)), but
only where the human remains and funerary objects are all at least 100 years of
age. A headstone less than 100 years old placed atop a 100-year old or older
grave is, for purposes of ARPA, disaggregated from the grave. Similarly, if
100-year old or older human remains previously exhumed are reinterred in a
coffin or other container that is less than 100 years old, for purposes of ARPA
the coffin is disaggregated from the grave. Thus, ARPA's definition of
"archaeological resources" provides no support for a grave being a unified res
under the law.
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606 F. Supp. 801, 805 (S.D. Ga. 1984) ("[w]hen personalty is
found embedded in land however, title to that personalty vests with
the owner of the land"(citations omitted)). Or, to put it another
way, "when the owner of the land where the property is found
(whether on or embedded in the soil) has constructive possession
of the property such that the property is not "lost," it belongs to the
owner of the land." Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 578 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985). In the
instant case, the Chaco Nation is not the true owner of the two
ceramic vessels embedded in Williamson's land, and there is no
statute requiring that a dead body and the objects placed with that
body in a grave be considered a unified res. Therefore, I would
hold that, as between Williamson and the Chaco Nation,
Williamson's right in this property is superior to that of the Chaco
Nation, and that vesting ownership of this property in the Chaco
Nation would result in a taking of Williamson's property.'"
Where no lineal descendant can be ascertained for associated
funerary objects removed from the Chaco Nation's reservation
lands, Congress has confirmed the right of the Chaco Nation in
these cultural items as the beneficial owner of the land. Were
Congress to transfer the Chaco Nation's right in these cultural
items removed from the Chaco Indian Reservation to Williamson,
the result would be a taking of property without compensation
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. In the same manner,
I would confirm the right of Williamson in the cultural items in
question as the owner of the land in fee simple from which they
were removed and would conclude that transferring Williamson's
right in the two vessels to the Chaco Nation would result in a
taking of property without compensation within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. For all the above reasons I dissent and would
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
16. The majority mistakenly relies on Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La.
Ct. App. 1986), for the proposition that the placement of objects in a grave will
never make the objects subject to a property interest in the finder or landowner.
In Charrier, a thief removed Native American objects from the land without the
approval or permission of the landowner. The appellate court merely held that,
as between the thief and the descendant tribe (or, in NAGPRA's terms, the
"culturally affiliated" tribe), "grave goods" belong to the descendant tribe.
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